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Abstract—We present the design of a cross-layer protocol to
maintain connectivity in an earthquake monitoring and early
warning sensor network in the absence of communications in-
frastructure. Such systems, by design, warn of events that severely
damage or destroy communications infrastructure. However, the
data they provide is of critical importance to emergency and
rescue decision making in the immediate aftermath of such
events, as is continued early warning of aftershocks, tsunamis,
or other subsequent dangers. Utilizing a beyond line-of-sight
(BLOS) HF physical layer, we propose an adaptable cross-layer
network design that meets these specialized requirements. We
are able to provide ultra high connectivity (UHC) early warning
on strict time deadlines under worst-case channel conditions
along with providing sufficient capacity for continued seismic
data collection from a 1000 sensor network.
I. INTRODUCTION
We examine the common problem in sensor network design
of mismatched reliability constraints in a network where a
small fraction of traffic must meet strict delivery guarantees,
while the vast majority is subject to much looser requirements.
In this paper, we present a case study that demonstrates one
possible resolution of this disparity.
Earthquake monitoring and early warning sensor networks
provide an ideal framework to study this problem. While the
vast majority of such sensor networks’ capcity is dedicated to
non-emergency data collection, early warning and low-latency
seismic information is of the utmost importance in facilitating
rapid response to earthquakes. Decisions about emergency re-
source allocation rely on knowledge of magnitude and location
of the earthquake. As a result, faster seismic data collection
can correspond directly to lives saved.
Projects such as NASA’s AIST project and Japan’s
GEONET have demonstrated the capability to collect such
seismic data in real-time by utilizing GPS position data [1].
However, such systems typically rely on local telecommu-
nications infrastructure such as mobile networks or physical
connection to landlines. Unfortunately, this is precisely the
infrastructure that is unavailable in the wake of the disasters
they are designed to detect.
As an extreme example, the March 2011 earthquake in
Japan severely damaged every level of the telecommunications
infrastructure. 2 of 3 core fibers, 1.9 million fixed-line links,
and 29,000 mobile base stations were damaged. Core fibers
were not repaired for two days; other services took months
to be fully repaired. Even the planned “stopgap” capacity to
be implemented in the future has a timescale of hours to be
operational [2]. In order for earthquake sensor networks to be
most effective in mitigating the consequences of a disaster,
maintaining connectivity directly after the event is key.
We present a robust network design that is capable of
supporting high throughput non-emergency data collection
from a large number of nodes while still guaranteeing low
latency emergency notification with ultra-high confidence.
Importantly, this is accomplished in the absence of any
telecommunications infrastructure by utilizing relatively low
cost beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) HF communication via the
ionospheric waveguide. As such, our network is tolerant of the
extremely high bit error rate (BER) and long time of flight
(ToF) conditions necessary to achieve reasonable throughput
even in poor ionospheric conditions. Each stage of the design
process is evaluated under worst-case conditions to ensure that
we meet our ultra-high connectivity guarantee.
II. PROBLEM MODEL
In order to perform this case study, it was necessary to make
selections of specific values for model parameters. In this sec-
tion, we present the chosen requirements, sensor capabilities
and the model for the BLOS HF physical layer. However, over-
specification of the model could easily have led to exploitation
of features that invalidates the adaptability of our design
process. As such, we try to parameterize as few features as
possible leaving out, for example, assumptions about specific
geographic features, node placement, or earthquake location
and magnitude.
A. System Requirements
There are two key types of traffic our network aims to
support: non-emergency seismic data and emergency early
warnings. General seismic data is taken to consist of 10
kilobit reports generated hourly by each sensor in the network.
When a sensor detects an emergency, it generates a 500 bit
emergency report that must be delivered on a strict deadline.
Due to the limitations of the HF channel, we cannot
cost-effectively (alternatively, spectrum-efficiently) meet time
deadlines that match those typically seen in unstressed modern
communications infrastructure. Instead, we selected a more
modest time deadline of 15 seconds for emergency notifica-
tion; this includes collection of an emergency report (assumed
to be 500 bits long) from a subset of sensors reporting the
ar
X
iv
:1
21
2.
37
46
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 16
 D
ec
 20
12
emergency deemed by the server to be of the most importance
or to likely contain a diversity of information.
B. Sensor Network Hardware
Current seismic monitoring networks such as the California
Real Time GPS Network (CRTN) and Japan’s GEONET
typically have on the order of five hundred to one thousand
sensors [3]. For numeric simplicity we aimed to support a
maximum network size of 1000 sensors.
To enable time division multiplexing, we assumed each sen-
sor has the capability to maintain low-drift time information,
even in the event of GPS signal degradation or loss (e.g.
in particularly bad weather). As we are operating on a HF
channel, our timescale of interest is microseconds. Specifically,
our shortest packet duration will be about 400µs (see Section
IV-A). Assuming GPS signal deprivation for a day, requiring
a shift of less than 14 of a packet corresponds to 10
−4 s/day,
well within reason on modern hardware.
Given this time information, and utilizing the fact that these
sensors are designed to be immobile, we can establish and
maintain a record of the ToF delay between sensor and server
by having each sensor send it’s current time to the server and
then returning the ∆t. This only needs to be done once, at time
of network initialization (though we also provide capacity for
live calibration). When a sensor wishes to communicate to
the server at a specific time, it can compensate for the delay
such that the signal arrives at the server at the correct time
according to the server’s clock. Assuming channel reciprocity
(demonstrated for this physical layer in [4]), this information
can also be calibrated to regular server transmissions.
Finally, we make the assumption that sensors have the
ability to independently discriminate their own importance in
the event of an earthquake. This means that, on average, only
16 sensors try to report an emergency when one occurs. This
may be implemented in several ways. Purely physically, there
is some degree of self-selection merely due to the velocity
of seismic waves; sensors spread across an area as large as
California or Japan will not all register in the same second.
Additionally, some local high speed LOS communications
could be implemented between sensors, perhaps sectioning
them into classes that discuss emergency detection before
reporting via the HF channel. However, we do not speculate
here on specific implementation details as it seems highly
dependent on deployment conditions.
C. Physical Layer
We selected HF radio as our physical layer for two reasons:
While we could have implemented a meshed LOS network,
it would be just as vulnerable to local degradation as existing
infrastructure. Having settled on BLOS communication, cost
effectiveness drove us to HF radio. The alternatives, dedicated
SATCOM communication and aerial LOS relays, are orders
of magnitude more expensive to maintain consistently.
However, HF propagation in the ionospheric waveguide is
hardly an ideal channel. It is noisy, unpredictable, and low
capacity compared to typical VHF or UHF LOS channels.
We assume the system we are designing is to be installed in
an environment similar to California or Japan. Specifically,
this means that our system will be located at mid-latitude (as
opposed to high latitudes where the ionosphere is significantly
less predictable [5]) and that our sensors will be located no
more than 1000 kilometers from the server (A centrally located
server in California or Japan easily meets this requirement).
We assume that the base station has a much more powerful
transmitter and much more sensitive receiver than the sensors.
It could, for example, utilize an antenna array to achieve better
multipath rejection. Thus, we limit broadcast capability to the
server; sensors do not transmit to one another.
We abstracted the channel into three features: A standard
noisy bitstream, the presence of rapid, coherent fading, and
very slow (time constant of hours) fading.
1) Noisy Bitstream: We assume that we have a radio capa-
ble of communication at a bit error rate (BER) of 10−2 after
forward error correction. Depending on the slowly varying
channel state, it achieves this BER at 4kbps or 40kbps.
Switching between the two modes of operation is assumed
to occur in less than 500µs. Note that this is intended as a
loose bound; switching in the digital domain can occur much
faster.
Additionally, signal propagation in the channel is assumed
to have a long time ToF. We take this to be relatively constant
between fixed points and provide capacity for recalibration to
compensate for drift. However, we assume that the ToF can
be between 0ms and 20ms for any given sensor.
Radio links via the ionospheric channel with similar char-
acteristics (datarate, BER, and propagation time) have been
experimentally demonstrated [6] [7].
2) Rapid Fading: Experimental characterizations of high
latitude ionospheric HF channels have typically recorded
Doppler spreads on the order of a few Hz, with spikes up
to 50 or even 100 Hz [5] [8]. Both Japan and California sit
closer to mid-latitude, where the channel is expected to be
somewhat better behaved. Including the effects of coherent
fading in a stochastic analysis is extremely non-trivial. Instead,
we consider these effects from the perspective of coherence
time. If we assume a typical value of 10Hz, this gives a
coherence time (τcoh) of 50ms with the typical convention
[9] that τcoh = 12D .
3) Slow Fading: It is well established that the ionospheric
channel varies greatly between night and day [8]. Thus, we
assume that the channel slowly varies such that, for hours at
a time we can achieve 40kpbs operation at the design BER of
10−2 while for other stretches of hours at a time we can only
achieve 4kbps at the same BER.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The main goal of this design is to support two services
with disparate reliability and throughput requirements. To cope
with this, we introduce service divisions in our network in two
ways: time division multiplexing and network state transitions.
These divisions are at the core of our design. While the
work was unknown when this design was first conceived, the
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Fig. 1. System diagram detailing service divisions. Of note is the design decision to allocate 100% of system capacity to emergency data collection once
an emergency is reported. Gray indicates a state that is not currently selected.
principles introduced in [10] helped greatly in clarifying our
work.
At the most basic level, the network can either be in
“Normal Operation” mode or “Emergency Data Collection”
mode. Transition from the former to the latter is governed by
a contention system: When sensors detect an emergency, they
participate in a lottery to notify the server. Once the server
detects such a notification, it triggers a switch to emergency
mode. Transition back to normal operation occurs only once
the server (or decision maker controlling the server) is satisfied
sufficient information has been collected.
As routine data collection is a separate service from emer-
gency reporting, and we cannot support simultaneous collec-
tion from all 1000 sensors, we must ensure that sensors main-
tain their proper configuration. If a sensor is misconfigured
(e.g. the ToF has drifted), it may detect an emergency but be
unable to communicate that to the server. To ensure reliability
of the network, we provide capacity for a second type of
critical information: network health monitoring. Following
[10], we refer to this as the “Heartbeat Service.”
In the intersts of clarity, we have included a system diagram
in Figure 1.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
A. Packetization
The high BER property of our channel model means
that communication cannot be reasonably conducted via IP
packets. Ignoring coherent fading effects and adopting a
simple Bernoulli process model for errors, the probability
that a packet of length Lp is transmitted without error is
(1 − BER)Lp . Plugging in the BER of 10−2, a typical
bodyless IP packet of 160 bits has a probability of successful
transmission of only 20%. Instead, we implement a shorter
packet design that allows us to exploit unique features of a
sensor network.
Given a network of N sensors, we need an address length
A = dlog2(N)e to be able to identify specific sensors. To
detect errors, we append a cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
to each packet. Calling the number of “payload” bits or
information-carrying bits per packet Ip, our packet CRC needs
to be Cp = dlog2(Lp)+1e bits long in order to detect all errors
that have either an odd number of, or less than four, bit flips
[11].
The expected value of successful packets per packet trans-
mission is (1−BER)Lp . Thus, the expected throughput is
R
Lp
(Lp − Cp −A)(1−BER)Lp (1)
where R is the datarate in bits/sec.
Plotting this equation (Figure 2a) makes it clear that if
we restrict ourselves to packet lengths that are powers of 2,
64 bit packets have the highest expected throughput, though
32 bit packets are only about 5.3% lower. However, 32
bit packets have several advantages, especially taking into
account coherent fading. At the slow transmission rate, a 64-bit
packet takes 15.6ms to transmit, corresponding to a maximum
Doppler spread of 32 Hz, well below the occasional peaks
measured in, for example, [5]. As such, we should expect a
reasonable number of extra packets lost to coherent fading
with the selection of 64 bit packets over 32 bit packets.
Additionally, we must take into account the problem of
transmitting an entire 10kbit hourly report, not just single
packets. We could proceed directly by breaking the 10kbit
report into packets and transmitting them one-by-one. How-
ever, in the event of undetected packet error, we would have
to retransmit the entire 10kbit report. Instead, we first break
each report into chunks, each with their own CRC, and then
append a final CRC to the report as a whole.
In order to calculate the throughput of this system, we
need to know the probability of an undetected error, Pu.
As mentioned earlier, a properly selected CRC of length
dlog2(Lp) + 1e cannot detect even numbers of bit-flips of 4
or more [12]. Thus, the probability of an undetected error in
a packet is
Pu =
Lp/2∑
k=2
(
Lp
2k
)
(BER)2k(1−BER)Lp−2k. (2)
Our expected number of successful blocks per block trans-
mission is (1 − Pu)Lb/Ip where the ratio in the exponent
denotes the number of successful packets required to transmit
one block. The information per block, Ib, is equal to Lb minus
the length of the necessary CRC, Cp = dlog2(Lb) + 1e.
Bringing this all together, the expected long term throughput
is
Ib
R
Lp
Ip(1−BER)Lp
LB
(1− Pu)Lb/Ip . (3)
We plot this in Figure 2b. Note that a slight bump in
BER causes the throughput of the 64 bit packets to drop
proportionally twice as much as the 32 bit packets (4.1% vs.
1.8%). This suggests their improved performance comes at the
cost of decreased robustness to fluctuating channel conditions;
an unacceptable trade off in this system. This, in combination
with the previous consideration of coherent fading, led to our
selection of 32 bit packets.
We select a 512 bit block over a 1024 bit block for better
efficiency in transmitting the 10240 bit hourly report. With
512-bit blocks, we use 43% of the final (21st) block; with
1024-bit blocks, we use only 12% of the final (10th) block.
As we send the entire block in both cases, the 512-bit block
is more efficient. The shorter block also helps to decrease the
number of retransmissions in the event of a failed block.
B. Server Scheduled MAC
Because we are interested in earthquake early warning on
the timescale of seconds, we divide time into one second
frames. At a datarate of 4 kbits/sec and a packet size of 32
bits, this corresponds to 128 packet slots per frame.
We dedicate 80 packets per frame to transmission of general
seismic data collection from sensors to the server, distributed
equally among 5 sensors per frame. Splitting the use of
the channel among multiple users in this way combats the
efficiency loss of MAC scheduling packets being corrupted or
lost.
Which packet slots each sensor (numbered 1-5) broadcast
on are constant; the server simply assigns sensors to slots 1
through 5-this fully defines which 16 slots they are to broad-
cast on. The server performs this scheduling by broadcasting
5 bodyless packets in order with the first packet denoting the
user of slot 1 and so on. It repeats these twice to increase the
probability that the packet arrives without error at the intended
sensor.
There is a slight possibility of collision here: if a sensor
receives its MAC scheduling packet correctly, and another
receives one with precisely the four bit flips corresponding
to its difference from the intended address, the two stations
would try to transmit over one another that frame, resulting in
16 packets lost (and subsequently all NAKed). Combining the
tiny probability of this with the fact that the effect is erased the
next frame means it does not meaningfully affect the efficiency
of the channel.
This scheduling allows ACK/NAK replies to be handled
with a small number of bits as well. Each user sends 16
packets in a given frame, which is precisely the number of
payload bits per packet. The server sends 5 ACK/NAK packets
(one for each sensor that transmitted), with the corresponding
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Fig. 2. (a) Throughput vs. packet size at BER = 10−2 under a Bernoulli
error assumption. Circular markers correspond to packet sizes that are a power
of 2. (b) Throughput vs. block size under a Bernoulli error assumption. Black
denotes a 32 bit packet, gray a 64 bit packet. Solid lines correspond to
BER = 10−2, dashed to BER = 1.1 × 10−2. The discontinuities in
both graphs are due to the ceiling function in the calculation of minimum
CRC length.
bit representing either NAK (0) or ACK (1) for each of the
received packets. We repeat these three times to decrease the
probability that a properly received packet is retransmitted
or a NAKed packet is misunderstood to have been properly
received.
C. Control and Heartbeat Service
Despite the built in repetition noted above, ACK/NAK
replies will be misunderstood occasionally. To combat this,
we include the capacity for the server to request that a sensor
retransmit a specific packet during one of the frame’s “reply”
slots. Requesting such a retransmission is one use for the
control packets included in the above frame design; we outline
several other uses here:
• ToF Calibration: If the server recognizes that a sensor’s
transmissions are impinging on neighboring time slots, it
sends the ∆t to the sensor to recalibrate it
• General Health Check: Sends a random number to a
sensor and ensures that the sensor echoes this number
back properly
• Channel Rate Check: Ask a sensor to attempt communi-
cation at high rate, to check if the channel can support it
(see Section IV-E)
• Software Updates: For instance, if the operator wishes to
redefine the meaning of different packet slots to improve
performance in a given environment.
• Notification that emergency mode has begun
As we are only routinely communicating with five sensors
per frame, information about the proper operation and con-
figuration of all the other sensors quickly grows stale. If, for
instance, the channel has shifted such that a sensor’s ToF data
is off, this may impair its ability to trigger an early warning.
As such, we build in capacity for a “heartbeat service” that
is used to continuously verify the health and configuration of
sensors.
Due to the limited number of packets per frame, we have
included the capability for an arbitrary set control packets
multiplexed with the heartbeat packets. This does not violate
our goal of separation of services; because there is a reply
associated with each control packet, we can use the control
packet to verify the proper configuration of the sensor.
To implement the heartbeat, we send all network control
commands encrypted with a sensor’s public key. The sensor
then decrypts this, verifying that it received the command and
processed it correctly, re-encrypts it with the server’s public
key, and send it back to the server in the appropriate reply
slot.
D. Emergency Mode
As noted previously, when sensors detect an emergency,
they enter a contention lottery. When attempting to contend,
each sensor randomly selects one of the 16 available slots
with uniform probability and attempts to transmit a header-
only packet with its address. If we have 16 sensors competing,
and there are n slots, the probability that any single slot has
exactly one packet broadcast is 16n (1 − 1n )15. As there are n
slots, the expected value of successful slots is 16(1− 1n )15.
Given that this is an emergency system, we would like to
guarantee a three-9 (99.9%) worst-case threshold for the time
from detection to warning. With 16 slots and 16 contenders,
we have a 0.047% chance of no successful packets. Any fewer
contention slots would drop below this threshold. However,
in the event that very few sensors are trying to contend, the
probability of contention success goes down significantly. To
see this, consider only two sensors contending; there is a 116
probability that they collide, well below our three-9 threshold.
Thus, in the interests of worst-case analysis we assume it takes
three seconds for the system to recognize an earthquake and
enter the emergency mode.
The server must then determine which sensors have data to
report. We do this by holding two 16 slot (32 half packet slot)
contention periods; this ensures that with very high probability
(as there are around 16 secondary stations attempting to trans-
mit) we determine all the stations with emergency information.
We then schedule the winners, starting with any who
triggered the initial emergency system, to send in their 500
bit emergency reports. We use an identical framing system as
the standard one with a 10 bit CRC on the 500 bit emergency
report. We do not batch users; whenever one finishes, we ask
another for its report. Once all emergency reports have been
collected, we run a final polling period to make sure we did
not miss any in the initial contention period.
The 500 bit emergency reports, with a 10 bit CRC, fit into
32 packets. At the typical BER, this takes 44.1 attempted
packet transmissions. Allowing for truly poor conditions, even
if it takes 60 packets to collect the error report, five will be
completed every four seconds, meaning a maximum of just
over 12 seconds to collect all 16 of the relevant emergency
alerts, putting us 3 seconds under our design goal of 15
seconds.
As a summary of the previous several sections, here is the
outline of a single frame in 4kbps operation:
1) Server Broadcast:
• 1 Packet of all zeros, indicating channel is in low rate
mode
• 4 Heartbeat/Control Packets
• Interleaved:
– 10 MAC Scheduling Half-Packets (5 distinct packets,
each sent twice)
– 15 ACK/NAK Packets for previous frame (5 distinct
packets)
• Let channel settle for length of 3 packets
2) Sensor Transmission:
• Interleaved from all transmitting sensors:
– 80 General Seismic Data Packets
– 4 Heartbeat/Control Replies
• 16 Emergency contention half-packet slots
• Let channel settle for length of 3 packets
E. High Rate Operation
In order to maintain continuity with the 4kbps scheme, we
again work with 1 second blocks. However, as the data rate
is ten times faster, we now have 1280 packets to work with.
The following frame outline contains the salient details of high
speed operation:
1) Server Broadcast:
• 1 Packet of all ones, indicating channel is in high rate
mode (duration of 10 packets)
• 2 Heartbeat Packets (duration of 20 packets)
• Wait 1 packet duration while all radios switch to 40kpbs
operation
• Interleaved Transmissions:
– 10 MAC Scheduling Half-Packets (5 distinct packets,
each sent twice)
– 70 Control Packets
• Let channel settle for length of 26 packets
2) Sensor Transmission:
• Interleaved from all transmitting sensors:
– 800 General seismic data packets
– 70 Replies to Control Packets
• Wait 1 packet duration while all radios switch to 4kpbs
operation
• 16 Emergency contention half-packet slots in slow oper-
ation (duration of 80 packets)
• Let channel settle for length of 30 packets
The most import part of this design is that the emergency
contention period lines up with “slow” operation. Even if
a sensor is configured for the wrong datarate, it will still
be able to participate in the emergency contention, which
always takes place at 4kbps. The same holds for all heartbeat
communications.
As a brief summary of other changes, the channel status
is monitored by sending out test packets (in the command
slots) that are hashed and then returned. When the percent
success drops below a certain level (to be determined by in-
field testing), the sensor decides the channel has deteriorated
and, at the beginning of the next frame, broadcasts a packet
of 0’s to indicate that sensors should stay in 4kbps mode.
For the inverse direction, using the heartbeat/control packets
in 4kbps operation, the server can indicate that it would like
certain sensors to switch to 40kbps for the next frame. Then,
the central and relevant sensors all switch to 40kbps operation
and the server sends out test packets. This is checked on the
third frame’s slots 97-104; the hashed versions are returned
at 40kbps. If the server determines the channel is fit, it then
switches to 40kbps operation.
F. Network Capacity Analysis
A user needs to send 672 packets successfully to transmit
a 10kbit report. At a bit error rate of 10−2, the probability
a 32 bit packet is transmitted without error is very close to
72.5%. The probability that a packet is transmitted with an
undetectable error is approximately 0.027%.
As we also have a CRC-10 code for every 502 bits (essen-
tially every 32 packets), the likelihood of having to retransmit
the entire hourly report is close enough to zero that our steady
state analysis is sufficient. We do expect to have to retransmit
a 512 bit chunk one out of every 114 times (or essentially
once every six reports). The probability of detectable error
is about 27.5%, meaning that we expect to have to transmit
927 packets per hourly report. At 4kbits/sec, we transmit 16
packets per second per user for five parallel users. This means
that, on average, we spend 11.6 seconds per user per hour.
In principle this suggests we could support up to 310 sensors
solely in the 4kbit/sec mode. Of course, this would fall apart
under stressed conditions and is therefore not acceptable for
an emergency system.
However, we can support many more users, over the long
term, by utilizing the high-rate mode. For the 40kbit/sec mode,
we transmit 160 packets per second per user, so we can
reasonbly expect to spend about 1.16 seconds per user per
hour, or be able to support up to about 3100 users.
Assuming that the system spends half its time in one state
and half in the other, on average we hit about 1700 users, well
exceeding our design goal of 1000. This overhead is good;
it allows us to deal with things like unexpected corruption,
missed frames, etc. And, given the size of the overhead,
deviations to below 1000 are exceedingly unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset, this work was intended as a case
study in networks, particularly sensor networks, that must
handle traffic with disparate reliability constraints. The success
of our design is predicated on two main features: the model
we selected and the service divisions we implemented.
Model selection is perhaps the most important step in any
design process; it is impossible to adequately capture every
aspect of the real world in the language of mathematics. As
such, it is important to make parameter selections that are
as adaptable as possible. This is doubly true when trying
to support UHC services; exploiting a quirk in your model
quickly leads to unreliable systems when the real world
behaves unexpectedly.
This leads directly to the implementation of service divi-
sions. We were able to take advantage of less reliable capacity
(the slowly varying channel state) to gain throughput for less
essential services without sacrificing reliability for those which
required strict delivery guarantees.
Utilizing these two features, we have presented and vali-
dated a cross-layer network design that meets the design goals.
It supports UHC operation for a small subset of traffic while
providing sufficient throughput for the less time sensitive, but
much higher density, non-emergency data collection.
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